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Abstract—The ongoing net neutrality debate has generated a
lot of heated discussions on whether or not monetary interactions
should be regulated between content and access providers.
Among the several topics discussed, ‘differential pricing’ has re-
cently received attention due to ‘zero-rating’ platforms proposed
by some service providers. In the differential pricing scheme,
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can exempt data access charges
for on content from certain CPs (zero-rated) while no exemption
is on content from other CPs. This allows the possibility for
Content Providers (CPs) to make ‘sponsorship’ agreements to
zero-rate their content and attract more user traffic. In this paper,
we study the effect of differential pricing on various players in
the Internet. We first consider a model with a monopolistic ISP
and multiple CPs where users select CPs based on the quality
of service (QoS) and data access charges. We show that in a
differential pricing regime 1) a CP offering low QoS can make
have higher surplus than a CP offering better QoS through
sponsorships. 2) Overall QoS (mean delay) for end users can
degrade under differential pricing schemes. In the oligopolistic
market with multiple ISPs, users tend to select the ISP with
lowest ISP resulting in same type of conclusions as in the
monopolistic market. We then study how differential pricing
effects the revenue of ISPs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The term ’network neutrality’ generally refers to the princi-
ple that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) must treat all Internet
traffic of a particular class on an equal basis, without regard to
the type, origin, or destination of the content or the means of
its transmission. What it implies is that all points in a network
should be treated equally without any discrimination on speed,
quality or price. Some of those features have made internet to
grow at such a fast rate. Any practice of blocking, throttling,
preferential treatment, discriminatory tariffs of content or
applications is treated as non-neutral behavior. In this paper
we study non-neutral behavior related to discriminatory access
prices – the price ISP charges the end users to provide access
to the CPs.
In recent years, with the growing popularity of data inten-
sive services, e.g., online video streaming and cloud-based
applications, Internet traffic has been growing more than 50%
per year [1], causing serious network congestions, especially
in wireless networks which are bandwidth constrained. To
sustain such rapid traffic growth and enhance user experiences,
ISPs need to upgrade their network infrastructures and expand
capacities. However, the revenues from end-users are often not
enough to recoup the corresponding costs and ISPs are looking
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at other methods for revenue generation. Some methods being
adopted are moving away from flat rate pricing to volume
based pricing [4], especially by the wireless ISPs. On the
other hand, CPs that work on different revenue models (mainly
advertisements driven) are seeing growth in revenues [2] due
to higher traffic. Pointing to this disparity, some ISPs have
proposed that CPs return the benefit of value chain by sharing
their revenues with them. In [3], the author describes evolution
of the pricing structure on the Internet along the different
relationships between CPs, ISPs and end users. It is observed
that:“the network neutrality issue is really about economics
rather than freedom or promoting/stifling innovation.”
While ISPs earnings depend on the total volume of traffic
that flows through their networks (under volume based pric-
ing), CPs revenue often depends on what fraction of that is
directed to it. Also, as noted in [3], there is a lot of competition
on the content side of the Internet, but not enough at the last
mile ISPs as most of times it is a monopolistic market. To
increase their share of traffic, many CPs are exploring various
smart data pricing (SDP) schemes [5] and also exploring favors
from ISPs so that they stand out in the competition. Some
CPs prefer that ISPs incentivise the end users to access their
content more either by giving higher priority to its content or
exempting access charges on it. In turn, CPs can share the
gains with the ISPs. This looks like an attractive proposition
for ISPs who anyway wants CPs to share their revenue with
them. Among the various models for monetary interactions,
zero-rating has found traction.
In zero-rating, an ISP and CPs enter into sponsorship
agreement such that the ISP subsidizes data traffic charges
(or access price) applicable on the content accessed from
the CPs. The CPs compensate the ISP either by repaying
the subsidy amount or offer free advertisement services. In
return, sponsoring CPs hope to get more traffic and earn higher
advertisement revenues. The article [6] describes an economic
mechanism based on subsidization of usage-based access cost
of users by the CPs. The author argue that this induces an
improvement of the revenue of the ISP and thus strengthen the
investment incentives. Zero-rating of content has no effect on
the end users under flat-rate pricing models. However it affects
their decisions under volume based subscription where they are
charged based on the amount of traffic they consume. We thus
focus on volume based pricing models which is predominantly
followed (or being planned) by the wireless ISPs.
Differential pricing schemes, and in particular zero-rating
methods, are non-neutral as it allows ISPs to discriminate
content based on its origin. Net neutrality advocates argue
that differential pricing hinders innovations at the CPs as
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2new entrants cannot afford to get their content zero-rated and
will be left out in the competition. Those favoring differ-
ential pricing argue that it helps more users connect to the
Internet, especially in the developing countries where Internet
penetration is still low. Some of zero-rated platforms like
BingeOn by T-Mobile, FreeBee by Verizon, and Free Basics
by Facebook are accused of violating net neutrality principles
and are under scrutiny. The issue of differential pricing is
now a part of consultations launched by several regulatory
authorities including the FCC, European Commission, CRTC
[7], [8] seeking public and stake holders’ opinion. Differential
pricing is banned in Chile and The Netherlands with India
being the latest to do so [9], [10].
Zero-rating is a SDP scheme through which CPs aim to
attract more user traffic. However, pricing schemes alone do
not guarantee higher traffic as quality of service (QoS) also
matters for users. While QoS experienced at CPs depends on
long term planning and investment in the service capacities of
their facilities, pricing strategies can be based on short term
planning and constitute running costs. The CPs can tradeoff
between long term and running costs to maximize their
revenues. Our aim in this paper is to understand how zero-
rating schemes affect revenues of CPs and QoS experienced
by the users. Specifically, we ask if a CP offering lower QoS
can earn more revenue than CPs offering higher QoS through
differential pricing? And, can QoS experienced by users under
differential schemes degrade compared to the case where it is
not allowed (neutral regime).
As no market data is available for an empirical study of the
effect of differential pricing, we take an analytical approach
and model the scenario as follows: we consider a single
ISP connecting users to a set of CPs that offer same/similar
content. Users’ decision to select a CP depends on the QoS
and access price for the content at that CP. The users constitute
mobile devices or any internet enabled devices that generate
requests to access content from the CPs. The requests are
assumed to be generated according to a Poisson process.
We consider a hierarchical game where ISP act as a leader
and sets access price. The CPs then negotiate with the ISP
and competitively decide what fraction of access prices they
will sponsor (or subsidize) such that their utility, defined as
the difference between the average revenues earned from the
user traffic and the amount they have to pay to the ISP, is
maximized. Finally, knowing CPs decisions users compete
and select CPs such that their cost, defined as the sum of
mean delay and the corresponding access price, is minimized.
We analyze the hierarchical game via a backward induction
technique.
Our analysis reveals that answers to both previous questions
can be positive. We identify the regimes where differential
pricing schemes lead to unfair distribution of revenues among
CPs and users QoS experience degrades. However, if access
price set by ISPs are regulated, both the unfavorable scenarios
can be avoided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we discuss the model and settings of the hierarchical game.
We begin with equilibrium behavior of the users in Section III
and study mean delay experienced by them in Section IV. In
section V, we study the preference of CPs for the differential
pricing and demonstrate that the game need not have Nash
equilibria. In Section VI, we consider the exogenous demand
and study its effect on the CPs’ behavior. In Section VII, we
analyze the game where CPs decisions are restricted to either
fully sponsor the access price or do not sponsor at all. We
study the resulting monetary gain for the ISP at equilibrium in
Section VIII. We extend our analysis to include multiple ISPs
in Section IX. Finally, we discuss regulatory implications of
our analysis and future extensions in Section X.
A. Literature review
There is a significant amount of literature that analyzes
various aspects of the net neutrality debate, like incentive for
investment, QoS differentiation, side payments or off-network
pricing through analytical models. For a detailed survey see
[11]. However, the literature on the effect of differential pricing
and QoS experienced by users in this regime are few and we
discuss them below.
In [12], the authors study a game between a CP and an ISP
where the ISP first sets the price parameters for sponsorship
and the CP responds by deciding what volume of content it
will sponsor. This model assumes that the users always access
the sponsored content irrespective of the QoS which is not
always true. Multiple CPs involving larger (richer) and smaller
revenues are considered in [13]. When the ISP charges both
the end users and the CPs, it is argued that richer CPs derive
more benefit through sponsorship in the long run (market
shares are dynamic). Negotiation between the ISP and CPs
are studied in [14] using Stakelberg game or Nash bargaining
game where CPs negotiate with the ISP for higher QoS for
its content. It is argued that QoS at equilibrium improves in
both the games. The analysis involving stakelberg game is
extended to multiple CPs in [15]. A scheme named Quality
Sponsor Data (QSD) is proposed in [16] where ISPs make
portion of their resources available to CPs for sponsorship.
Voluntary subsidization of the data usage charges by CPs
for accessing their content is proposed in [17]. It is argued
that voluntary subsidization of traffic increases welfare of the
Internet content market. Hierarchal games involving ISP, CPs
and multiple type of users is analyzed in [18] and show
that all parties benefit form sponsored data. However, the
work ignores the effect of QoS. In [19], QoS parameter are
considered in deriving the total traffic generated by the users.
A stakelberg game between an ISP and CPs are analyzed
where the ISP decides the access price and the CPs decide
whether or not to sponsor user traffic. Competition among
the users and their strategic behavior is not considered in
this work. Furthermore, this work considers ‘QoS index’ as
an exogenous parameter (required bandwidth), whereas we
consider perceived QoS by the users. In [20], the authors
study ISPs optimal service differentiation strategy subject to
its network capacity constraints. Based on optimal taxation
theory, the authors consider an optimal control problem. In
[21], the authors propose a model considering sponsored data
plans in which content providers pay for traffic on behalf of
their consumers. In this paper, the authors consider a demand-
response type model for end users consumption whereas, in
3our framework we assume a congestion game in order to
model the interaction through a quality metric, that impacts
directly the demand. Agreements between CPs about linking
their contents and there propose a better offer is analyzed
in [22] through the network neutrality prism. The authors
show that CPs are interested in reaching a linking agreement
when the termination fee set by the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) is not particularly high. In their model, the authors do
not also consider explicit congestion at the demand side, as
we consider in our analysis. Moreover, we do not consider
agreements between CPs about content, we assumer only
possible economic agreements between CPs and one ISP.
Our work differs from all the models studied in the literature
as we consider users to be strategic and traffic distribution
in the network is derived from their equilibrium behavior.
Further, we focus on QoS offered at the CPs and study how
it influences the CPs sponsorship decisions and how it in turn
affects the revenue of the ISPs. This work is an significant
extension of an earlier conference version [24] that only
considered the single ISP case with preliminary discussions
about exogenous arrivals.
II. MODEL AND SETUP
We first consider a monopolistic market with a single
Internet Service Provider (ISP) that connects end users to
the Internet. We focus on a particular type of non-elastic
traffic like content, say videos, music, or online shopping, that
the users can access from content providers (CPs). Multiple
CPs offer same/similar type of contents and end users can
access content from any of them. The ISP charges c monetary
units per unit of traffic accessed through its network to the
end users. We refer to this price as the ‘access price’. As
specified in [4], recently, broadband ISPs in US and Europe
introduce a data-cap and adopt a two-part tariff structure, a
combination of the flat-rate and usage-based pricing. Under
such a two-part scheme, additional charges are imposed if
a users data usage exceeds the data cap and the exceeded
amount is charged based on a per-unit fee. Therefore, we
consider in our model the usage-based part of the scheme
which integrates the relationship between access price and
demand. Let N denote the number of CPs and [N ] the set
of CPs. Each CP can enter into zero-rating-agreement with
the ISP. In this case, CP pays a proportion of the access price
for the content accessed from it and the ISP passes on the
benefit to the end users. This proportion may be different for
each CP. Let γi ∈ [0 1], i ∈ [N ] denotes the fraction of the
access price end users pay to access content of i-th CP (also
denoted CPi). The value of γi, i ∈ [N ] is decided by i-th
CP and we refer to it as the subsidy factor. For every unit of
traffic accessed from i-th CP, end users and i-th CP pay γic
and (1−γi)c, respectively, to the ISP. We allow the possibility
for i-th CP to pay the ISP only ργic per unit traffic accessed
from it, where ρ ∈ (0 1]. This parameter determines the level
of negotiation between CPs and the ISP. We refer to the special
cases when γi ∈ (0 1), γi = 0, and γi = 1, as i-th CP is
Partially-sponsoring (P), Sponsoring (S), and No-sponsoring
(N), respectively.
Fig. 1: Interaction between the ISP, CPs and end users.
We consider a large population of end users that access the
content from CPs by sending requests to them. The requests
are generated according to Poisson process with a rate λ. Each
request results in a certain amount of traffic flow between the
CPs and end users going through the ISP. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the mean traffic flow per request is
one unit1. Each end user decides which CP to send its request
and this selection does not depend on the choice of other
users and its past decisions2. The quality of the service (QoS)
experienced by end users depends on the quantity of requests
served and the service capacity of the CPs. The later depends
on the investments in infrastructure. Higher the investments
more is the capacity. Let mi, i ∈ [N ] denotes the service
capacity of i-th CP and let Ti(λi) denotes the QoS experienced
by end users at i-th CP when the CP is serving λi requests.
We stress that the QoS here refers to that experienced at the
CPs and not on the Internet backbone or the ISP network. The
network model for the case of two CPs is depicted in Figure
1.
A. Utility of Users
Each end user likes its request to be served as early as
possible. We consider the mean delay experienced at each CP
as QoS metric and set Ti(x) = 1mi−x for all i ∈ [N ], which
is a well known mean (stationary) delay value in a M/M/1
queue [23]3. End users’ decision on which CP to send their
request depends on the QoS as well as the access price. We
define utility (or cost ) of each end user by selecting a CP as
the sum of mean delay and access price it incurs at that CP.
Specifically, the cost of an end user served at i-th CP with
requests at rate x is4
Ci(x) := Ci(x,mi, c, γi) =
{
1
mi−x + γic if mi > x,
∞ otherwise.
(1)
1Otherwise ρ can be appropriately scaled. See (2).
2The assumption that users do not have memory is not overly restrictive as
the population is large and each new request is likely from a different user.
3Note that if the service times at the CPs are exponentially distributed, then
1/(mi − x) gives the exact value of mean delay at i-th CP when it receives
request at Poisson rate x.
4A more general cost function Ci(x) that is convex and strictly increasing
in x can also be analyzed using techniques we use in this paper.
4Each end user aims to select a CP that gives the minimum
cost. Note that this formulation is the same as allowing each
user to choose a CP with the lowest mean delay subject to a
price constraint. This criteria also turns out to be optimizing
weighted sum of mean delay and price with the weight
corresponding to the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the
constraint.
B. Utility of Content Providers
The revenue of CPs is an increasing function of the number
of requests they receive. Generally, CPs revenue comes from
per-click advertisements accessible on their webpages and
higher requests imply more views of advertisements (for
example, CP can embed an advertisement in each request
served) resulting in higher income. We define utility of CPi
as the net revenue earned after discounting the access price
through sponsorship. Let Ui denote the utility of CPi, i ∈ [N ],
when it sponsors γi fraction of access price and receives λi
mean number of requests, then:
Ui(γi) = fi(λi)− ρ(1− γi)cλi. (2)
The function fi(·) is monotonically increasing and denotes
the revenue from per-click advertisements for example. The
definition of this function is out of the scope of this paper.
The number of requests received at a CP is the function of
the γi, i ∈ [N ] set by all the CPs. End users react to these
decisions, and hence, the decision of CPs are coupled through
end users behavior. We assume that the value of mi, i ∈ [N ]
are fixed and are public knowledge.
C. Decision Timescale and Hierarchy
We now explain decision stages of our complex system
which involves different types of players: ISP, CPs and end
users. Each of them makes decisions in hierarchy and their
decisions change over different timescales. At the top of
the hierarchy the ISP sets the access price c which remains
fixed for a long duration. Next in the hierarchy CPs make
sponsorship decisions after knowing the access price set by
the ISP. The CPs decision (parameter γi) can change at a
timescale that is smaller than that of the ISP. At the bottom
level of the hierarchy the end users decide from which CP to
access content knowing subsidized access prices for all CPs.
The users’ decisions change at a smaller timescale than that
of the CPs.
In the following we study the game among each type
of players and how decisions of each type influences the
performance of the other players. We make the following
assumptions in the rest of the paper:
A1:
∑N
i=1mi > λ.
A2: mi < λ for all i ∈ [N ].
A3: m1 < m2 ≤ m3 . . . ≤ mN and m1 > λ/N .
The first assumption ensures that a user can always find a CP
where mean waiting time is bounded. The second assumption
implies that no single CP is capable of handling all the requests
alone and hence requests get spread across multiple CPs.
The last condition indexes the CPs according to their rank in
service capacity and ensures that the CP with lowest service
capacity gets non-zero amount of requests at equilibrium. For
notational convenience, we write m =
∑N
i=1mi − λ, which
denotes the excess service capacity in the network.
To maintain analytic tractability and get clear insights, we
restrict our theoretical analysis to the case with two CPs, i.e.,
set N = 2. However, for the general N numerical studies can
be done as it turns out that equilibrium rates can be found
generally efficiently solving a convex program (see ( [25])).
We start with the study of end users behavior.
III. USER BEHAVIOR
In this section, we study how end users respond to spon-
sorship decisions by the CPs. Each user selects one CP to
process its request without knowing current occupancy of the
CPs nor the past (and future) arrival of requests from other
end users. Then, the end users’ decision to select a CP is
necessarily probabilistic and users aim to select CPs according
to a distribution that results in smallest expected cost. Since all
users are identical, we are interested in symmetric decisions
where every user applies the same probabilistic decision on
arrival of a new request. For any symmetric decision, arrival
rate of requests at each CP also follows a Poisson process by
the thinning property of the Poisson processes.
We apply Wardrop equilibrium conditions to find the equi-
librium decision strategy of large population of users [26]. Let
γ−i denote the subsidy factor of the CP other than CPi and
λ∗ = (λ∗1, λ
∗
2), where λ
∗
i := λ
∗
i (γi, γ−i), i ∈ [N ], is the arrival
rate at i-th CP at equilibrium. we have that
∑N
i=1 λ
∗
i = λ
∗.
Then we have the following properties coming from Wardrop
principles that can be summarized in our context to the
following sentence: ”Every strictly positive request implies
minimum cost” 5:
∀ λ∗i > 0 =⇒ Ci(λ∗i ) ≤ Cj(λ∗j ) for all j 6= i, (3)
which can also be expressed as
∀ i, λ∗i · (Ci(λ∗i )− α) = 0, where α = min
i
Ci(λ
∗
i ). (4)
Lemma 1: For N = 2 and a given action profile (γ1, γ2) of
the CPs, the equilibrium rates are as follows:
λ∗i = mi −
1
α− γic ∀ i = 1, 2, (5)
where α := α(γ1, γ2) is the equilibrium cost given by
α =
c(γ1 + γ2)
2
+
1
m
+
√
(c(γ1 − γ2))2
4
+
1
m2
. (6)
The following lemma follows immediately the previous
lemma.
Lemma 2: For given γi, i = 1, 2, the equilibrium rate λ∗i
is strictly increasing in γ−i, i.e., equilibrium rates at a CP
increases if the subsidy factor for other CP increases.
From equation (6), it is also clear that the equilibrium cost
α is monotonically increasing in c. However, the effect of c
on the equilibrium rates depends on the values of (γ1, γ2)
5We can apply Wardrop equilibrium conditions as the request arrivals satisfy
the PASTA (Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages) property [27].
5relative to each others. We have the following proposition
that describes monotonicity properties of the equilibrium rates
depending on the subsidy factors set by the CPs.
Proposition 1: For any (γ1, γ2), equilibrium rates satisfy the
following properties:
1) if γ1 < γ2, then λ∗1 is monotonically increasing in c
(and λ∗2 is decreasing in c).
2) if γ1 ≥ γ2, then λ∗1 is monotonically decreasing in c
(and λ∗2 is increasing in c).
Interestingly, when the sponsorship decisions of the CPs are
symmetric, i.e., all CPs set the same subsidy factor, users are
indifferent to the sponsorship decisions. To see this, notice
from (6) that when γi = γ ∀i = 1, 2 for some γ ∈ [0 1]
the equilibrium rates in (5) are independent of γ. Thus, if
the access prices for the content across all the CPs if either
increased or decreased by the same amount, users preferences
for the CPs do not change.
IV. MEAN DELAY IN THE NETWORK
In this section, we analyze the average waiting time (or
delay) experienced by a ’typical’ end user at equilibrium
situation. We refer to any user that arrives at equilibrium as a
typical end user.
Given a global rate λ, a fraction λ∗i /λ of the users’ requests
are served at i-th CP at equilibrium, and each one of them
incur mean delay of 1/(mi − λ∗i ). Since the end users are
homogeneous, the equilibrium strategy of each end user is
equivalent to the strategy to select CPi with probability λ∗i /λ.
Hence we define mean delay (henceforth referred simply as
delay) experienced by a typical user as:
D(c, γ1, γ2) =
N∑
i=1
λ∗i
λ
1
mi − λ∗i
. (7)
Lemma 3: Given (γ1, γ2) and c, we have
D(c, γ1, γ2) =
α
λ
2∑
i=1
mi − c
λ
2∑
i=1
miγi − 2
λ
, (8)
where α is given by Equation (6). And when γi = γ for all
i = 1, 2, for some γ ∈ [0 1] we get
D(c, γ) := D(c, γ, γ) =
2
m
. (9)
When γi are the same across all CPs, i.e., sponsorship deci-
sions are symmetric, then the delay does not depend neither
on the price set by the ISP nor on the subsidy factor set by the
CPs. In this case, delay only depends on the excess capacity–
larger the excess capacity smaller the delay. When N > 2, it
can be shown that the delay is given by N/m, i.e., increases
linearly with the number of CPs.
Lemma 4: For each couple (γ1, γ2), the delay D(c, γ1, γ2) is
convex in c. Further, if γ1 ≥ γ2 it is monotonically increasing
in c.
An heuristic argument is as follows. Recall the assumption
that m1 < m2. When γ1 > γ2, the equilibrium arrival rate
increases at CP2 (see Prop. 1) with c which in turn increases
delay experienced by a typical user at CP2. However, the
corresponding rate of delay decrease at CP1 (from the de-
creased arrival rate) is smaller due to its smaller capacity and
it results in a overall increase in delay. On the other hand,
when γ1 < γ2, the equilibrium arrival rate increases at CP1
(see Prop. 1) with c which in turn increases delay for a typical
user at CP1 but decreases at CP2. For smaller values of c,
the rate of increase in delay at CP1 is small compared to the
rate of decrease in delay at CP2 as m2 > m1. However, as
more arrivals shift to CP1 with larger value of c, the delay
increases significantly at CP1 and can dominate the rate of
decrease of delay at CP2. Hence, with increasing value c,
delay first decreases and then can increase. The threshold on
c where the delay changes its behavior, depends on the gap
between service capacity of the CPs, i.e., m2−m1; larger the
gap more prominent is the rate of decrease of delay at CP2
and hence decrease in delay continues over a larger values of
c.
In the following, we study mean delay experienced by
a typical user when the decisions of CPs are asymmetric
and compare it with the case when decision of the CPs are
symmetric. Since mean delay is invariant to the amount of
subsidy in the later case, we consider symmetric action profile
(N,N) (corresponding to γ1 = γ2 = 1) as a reference and
treat it as a regime with no-differential pricing or ‘neutral’.
The main result of this section follows.
Theorem 1: For any (γ1, γ2), the following properties hold:
1) If γ2 ≤ γ1, then D(c, γ1, γ2) ≥ D(c, 1, 1) for all c.
2) If γ2 > γ1, then D(c, γ1, γ2) ≥ D(c, 1, 1) if and only if
c(γ2 − γ1) ≥ 1
m
(
m2
m1
− m1
m2
)
. (10)
Notice that D(0, γ1, γ2) = D(c, γ, γ) for all γ1, γ2, γ ∈ [0 1]
and c. On one hand, for the case γ2 ≤ γ1, it is shown in lemma
4 that the delay is increasing in c, hence the first assertion in
the theorem implying that delay in the differential regime is
always higher compared to the neutral regime. On the other
hand, when γ2 > γ1, delay experienced by a typical user
is larger than in the neutral regime provided access price is
larger than a certain threshold, otherwise it will be smaller. To
understand this behavior notice that D(c, γ1, γ2) is convex in
c (see Lemma (4)). This indicates that there exists a threshold
on c above which delay will be higher than in the neutral
regime. As given in (10) this threshold increases if disparity
between the service capacities of the CPs (m2/m1) increases
and/or disparity between the access prices (γ2 − γ1) for the
content of the CPs decreases.
In summary, the above result suggests that the differential
pricing can be unfavorable to the users. Specifically, when the
CPs sponsorship decisions are asymmetric the mean delay for
a typical user can be higher than that in the neutral regime.
Theorem 1 also explains the effect of access price set by
the ISP on delay experienced by the users. When γ2 > γ1,
smaller access prices actually benefits the users as delay in
the differential regime is smaller compared with the neutral
regime. However, if the access prices is large, more than a
certain threshold, this favorable scenario no longer holds delay
in the network can be higher.
6Remark 1: In a differential regime, the QoS for end users
can be degraded compared to that in the neutral regime if the
CP with poor QoS offers higher subsidy than the CP with
better QoS.
V. BEHAVIOR OF CPS
In this section, we analyze the behavior of CPs in this
hierarchical system. Particularly, we are interested in the
question of which type of CPs prefer differential pricing or
zero-rating scheme. We study particularly if a CP with lower
service capacity can earn more revenue than the other CP
by allowing higher subsidy. We will then study competition
between the CPs and analyze their equilibrium behavior.
In the following we assume that the advertisement revenue
of each CP is proportional to their request arrival rate. We
set f(λi) = βλi, where β > 0 is a constant that depends on
how the traffic translates to revenues at the CPs which can
be obtained from statistical analysis of per-click data usage.
Utility of each CP depends on the vector (λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
N ) of
equilibrium rates and it is defined by (with abuse of notation):
Ui(γi, γ−i) = (β − (1− γi)ρc)λ∗i . (11)
Clearly, CPi will sponsor its content if and only if (1−γi) <
β/cρ.
A. Which CPs Prefer Differential Pricing?
In the differential pricing regime CP1 can attract more user
traffic than CP2 by offering higher subsidy. However, higher
subsidy may also increase the amount CP1 has to pay to ISP.
Then, a natural question is the following: can CP1 set its
subsidy factor such that it gets higher utility than CP2? The
following proposition gives the condition for this to happen.
Proposition 2: Let β = ρc/β ≤ 1. For given γ1, γ2, we
have that U1(γ1, γ2) ≥ U2(γ1, γ2) if and only if
λ∗1 ≥
λ
1−(1−γ1)β
1−(1−γ2)β + 1
. (12)
The technical condition β¯ < 1 allows the CPs to consider
all subsidy factors in the interval [0, 1]. If this condition is
not met, CPs have to keep subsidy factor over a restricted
range to get positive utility. Note that λ∗1 and the ratio on the
right hand of the above condition are both decreasing in γ1.
The rate of decrease of λ∗1 is lower when γ1 is small and the
above condition holds. Indeed, a numerical example in Fig.
2a demonstrates that the condition holds. In Fig. 2c we also
show a case where the condition does not hold. In particular,
when the difference between service capacities of the CPs is
relatively small, condition (12) holds for some γ1, and, in spite
of its inferior service capacity CP1 can earn higher utility.
However, when the difference between service capacities is
large, CP1 cannot get higher utility than CP2 through higher
subsidy.
These examples demonstrate that the differential pricing
regime can de-incentivizes the CPs from increasing their
capacity resulting in degraded QoS for the end users. Specif-
ically, the CPs with lower service capacity can prefer to offer
higher subsidy rather than investing in their infrastructure and
still end up earning higher revenue that CP that have invested
more in their infrastructure but are not offering higher subsidy.
Remark 2: In differential pricing regime, a CP with lower
QoS can earn more revenue than a CP with higher QoS by
offering appropriate subsidy on access price.
B. Non-Cooperative game between CPs
The CPs aim to maximize their utility by appropriately
setting their subsidy factor γi. We study the interaction as
a non cooperative game between the CPs where the action of
the CPi is to set a subsidy factor γi that maximizes its utility.
The CPs know that the end users select a CP to serve their
request based on quality and the (subsidized) access price they
offer. The objective of the i-th CP is given by the optimization
problem: maxγ∈[0 1] Ui(γ, γ−i).
We say that (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium for the
non-cooperative game between the CPs if Ui(γi, γ∗−i) ≤
Ui(γ
∗
i , γ
∗
−i) ∀i and γi ∈ [0 1]. For a given γ−i, i = 1, 2,
let γi(γ−i) denotes the best response of CPi, i.e., γi(γ−i) ∈
arg maxγ∈[0 1] Ui(γ, γ−i).
The utility functions are non-linear as illustrated in Figs.
2. In Fig. 2a, we depict utility functions of CP1 and CP2 as
a function of γ1 for a fixed value of γ2. Note that CP1 has
multiple optimum points. Similar behavior is observed in Fig.
2b. Further, notice that utilities of CP1 and CP2 have a steep
slopes as γ1 → γ2 and γ2 → γ1, respectively. This property
of CP utilities give raise to discontinuity in their best response
behavior. The discontinuity in the best response behavior leads
to non-existence of Nash equilibrium as illustrated In Figs.
3a - 3d. As seen, they have a point of discontinuity and
best response functions do not intersect. Hence equilibrium
do not exists in these examples. In the following we restrict
the actions of CPs to γi ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., either sponsor or not-
sponsor and study the non-cooperative game between the CPs.
VI. EXOGENOUS ARRIVAL OF DEMAND
In the previous setup the total traffic rate is a constant
and the total revenue for the ISP is λc irrespective of the
subsidy set by the CPs. This makes the ISP indifferent to
the differential pricing and zero-rating strategy proposed by
the CPs. However, higher subsidy by the CPs may attract
more traffic and in turn result in higher demand and then
potential revenue for the ISP. To account for this, we next
consider a model with exogenous generation of traffic in
addition to the usual traffic of rate λ. The exogenous traffic
corresponds to the increased demand that the CPs attract, in
addition to their usual traffic, by offering subsidies which
increase the total traffic generated by end users. Naturally,
higher is the subsidy offered by an CP higher is the exogenous
traffic it attracts. We model the exogenous traffic generated
for CPi offering subsidy γi to be linear in γi and given
by λ0(1 − γi), where λ0 ≥ 0 is a fixed constant which
represents the global maximum demand. The total traffic λ˜i
for CPi, i = 1, 2, when it attracts the usual traffic λi and offers
subsidy γi, is then determined by: λ˜i = λi+λ0(1−γi), where
λ1 + λ2 = λ, and the total traffic in the networks is given by
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Fig. 2: The utilities of CP1 and CP2 are compared with parameters β = 1, ρ = .9, c = 0.5, λ = 1200. In Fig. 2a capacities of
CPs are close, we set M1 = 700,M2 = 900 and γ2 = 0.5. Here, utility of CP1 is higher than that of CP2 for small values
of γ1. In 2b, we use the same parameters as in Fig. 2a with γ1 = 0.5. In Fig. 2c, service capacity utility of CP1 much lower
than that of CP2, we set M1 = 620,M2 = 900 and γ2 = 0.5. Here, utility of CP1 is always lower than that of CP2.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3: Best responses of both the CPs are shown with parameters M1 = 700,M2 = 900, c = 0.5, ρ = 0.9, β = 1. We set
λ = 1200, 1300, 1400, 1500 in Figs. 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d, respectively. In all both sub figures, the best response curve do not
cross each other, hence equilibrium does not exist. Note that the sharp drops denote the discontinuity in best response behavior.
The values in vertical and horizontal drops (dotted lines) does not correspond to range of the BR curves.
λ˜ := λ˜(γ1, γ2) = λ+
∑2
i=1 λ0(1− γi). We continue to make
the assumptions A1−A3 as earlier. Note that with exogenous
arrivals it may happen that
∑2
i=1mi < λ˜ if the subsidy offered
by the CPs is too high hence restraining the CPs from taking
such actions.
The usual traffic λ gets split between the CPs competitively
by the end users based on the QoS experienced and the access
price, whereas the exogenous traffic is fixed and depends only
on the subsidy factory. At equilibrium, the total traffic at CPi
is therefore given by λ˜∗i = λ
∗
i +λ0(1−γi) where (λ∗1, λ∗2) are
equilibrium flows set according to Wardrop criteria as earlier.
With exogenous arrivals, mean delay defined in Section IV
can be redefined as
D(c, γ1, γ2) =
N∑
i=1
λ˜∗i
λ˜
1
mi − λ˜∗i
. (13)
The analysis of mean delay and the results derived in the previ-
ous sections remain the same after replacing the capacities m1
and m2 by m1−λ0(1−γ1) and m2−λ0(1−γ2), respectively,
and
∑2
i=1mi ≤ λ˜.
The utilities of CPs with exogenous arrivals are redefined as
Ui(γi, γ−i) = (β − (1− γi)ρc)λ˜∗i ∀ i = 1, 2. (14)
The condition for CP1 to earn higher revenue than that of CP2
under exogenous arrivals remains the same as in Proposition 2
after replacing λ by λ˜ and λ∗1 by λ˜
∗
1. Hence, our earlier obser-
vation that the CP with lower QoS may earn higher revenue
that of the CP offering higher QoS holds under exogenous
arrivals. Similar to previous model, the best response for CPs
with exogenous traffic also have discontinuities and leads to
non-existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Elastic Demand: One could also model the total demand
generated by the users as elastic in the subsidy factor and
model it as Λ + Λ0(1−γ1) +λ0(1−γ1), where Λ and Λ0 are
constants, which gets competitively split across the CPs. The
difference between this model compared to exogenous arrivals
is that here subsidy of each CP’s effects the total demand not
just its demand. The analysis with the elastic model remains
essentially same as that in Sections V and VII. Hence we skip
the details. In the subsequent models we only consider the
model with exogenous arrivals.
VII. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME WITH ACTIONS {S, N}
In this section we focus on the study of non cooperative
game where CPs only play either Sponsor (S) or Not-sponsor
(N) actions, i.e., γi ∈ {0, 1} for all i = 1, 2 (no partial
sponsorship is allowed). The four possible action profiles are
denoted as (S, S), (N,N), (S,N), and (N,S). Here, profile
(S,N) indicates that action of CP1 is S (sponsor) and that
of CP2 is N (non-sponsor). For ease of notation, we add
8Action S
S U1 = (β − ρc)(m1 + λ0 − 1/α00)
U2 = (β − ρc)(m2 + λ0 − 1/α00)
N U1 = β(m1 + λ0 − 1/(α10 − c))
U2 = (β − ρc)(m2 + λ0 − 1/α10)
Action N
S U1 = (β − ρc)(m1 + λ0 − 1/α01)
U2 = β(m2 + λ0 − 1/(α01 − c))
N U1 = β(m1 + λ0 − 1/(α11 − c))
U2 = β(m2 + λ0 − 1/(α11 − c))
TABLE I: Utility for CPs over actions {S,N}
subscripts 00, 11, 01, 10 to the minimum equilibrium utility (α)
of these action profiles, respectively. The following theorem
gives equilibrium rates associated with these action profiles.
In the following we assume that m > 2λ0, i.e., the excess
capacity is enough to support all of the exogenous traffic and
mi > λ0 ∀i, i.e., each CP has enough capacity to handle all
of the exogenous traffic it can attract.
Theorem 2: The equilibrium rates are described as follows:
1) For action profile (S, S):
λ˜∗i = mi − λ0 − 1α00 ∀i where α00 = 2m−2λ0 .
2) For action profile (N,N):
λ˜∗i = mi − 1α11−c ∀i where α11 = c+ 2m .
3) For action profile (S,N):
λ˜∗1 = m1 − λ0 − 1α01 and λ˜∗2 = m2 − 1α01−c where
α01 = c/2 + 1/(m− λ0) +
√
c2/4 + 1/(m− λ0)2.
4) For action profile (N,S):
λ˜∗i = m1 − 1α10−c and λ˜∗2 = m2 − λ0 − 1α10 where
α10 = α01.
Corollary 1: The minimum equilibrium cost under different
action profiles satisfy the following properties:
• α00 ≥ α11 − c,
• α01 ≥ α00 ≥ α10 − c,
• c+ 1/(m− λ0) ≤ α01 ≤ c+ 2/(m− λ0).
Considering that each CP play only pure actions {S,N}, the
non-cooperative setting is a described by a 2× 2 matrix game
between the CPs. The utilities for both CPs over actions {S,N}
are given in Table 1.
Though it is well known that a mixed Nash equilibria always
exists in a finite matrix game but pure Nash equilibria may
not exists6. Since the decision of CPs has to be deterministic,
we are interested in the study of Pure strategy Nash Equilibria
(PNE) and its properties. The following theorem characterizes
all possible PNE.
Theorem 3: Let ρ, c, β be given. Then,
• (S, S) is a PNE if and only if
ρ/β ≤ 1/(α10 − c) + λ0 − 1/α00
c(m2 + λ0 − 1/α00) := A (15)
6Though γi ∈ [0, 1] can be thought of as probability distribution over
γi ∈ {0, 1}, it is to be noted that our earlier observation that non existence
of Nash equilibrium does not contradict the fact mixed Nash equilibrium
always exits. The CP utilities are highly nonlinear in γis and expected utility
over any mixed equilibria dervied from utilities associated with pure actions
does not have the same form as in (14).
• (N,N) is a PNE if and only if
ρ/β ≥ 1/(α11 − c) + λ0 − 1/α01
c(m1 + λ0 − 1/α01) := B (16)
• (S,N) is a PNE if and only if
1/(α10 − c) + λ0 − 1/α00
c(m2 + λ0 − 1/α00) ≤ ρ/β
ρ/β ≤ 1/(α11 − c) + λ0 − 1/α01
c(m1 + λ0 − 1/α01) (17)
• (N,S) cannot be a PNE.
Theorem 3 characterizes all PNE and Figure 4 depicts all
possible PNE in different range over ρ/β .
Fig. 4: The PNE as a function of ρ/β.
VIII. REVENUE GAIN FOR ISP
In this section we study the revenue gain for ISP induced
by applying differential pricing mechanism. The exogenous
traffic generated by the end users increases with higher subsidy
proposed by the CPs, which induces higher revenue for the
ISP. To measure this revenue gain, we consider the metric
called ’Revenue Gain Factor’ (RGF) defined as the ratio of
ISP revenue under the differential pricing scheme and that
under the neutral regime where none of the CPs subsidize the
access price, i.e., γi = 1 for any CP i, then:
RGF =
(λ+ λ0(1− γ1) + λ0(1− γ2))ρc
λρc
= 1 +
λ0(1− γ1) + λ0(1− γ2)
λ
. (18)
The following proposition describes explicit value of RGF
depending on the action profile of CPs.
Proposition 3: RGF under different action profiles are as
follows:
• For action profile (S, S): RGF = 1 + 2λ0λ
• For action profile (N,N): RGF = 1, i.e., there is no
revenue gain for the ISP
• For action profile (S,N): RGF = 1 + λ0λ
• For action profile (N,S): RGF = 1 + λ0λ .
Obviously, the RGF is the highest when both CPs sponsor.
However, the action profile (S, S) may not be always a
pure Nash equilibrium as proved in previous section. In the
following we illustrate the behavior of the RGF metric at
equilibrium with respect to parameters λ, λ0 and c. We note
that the value of RGF at equilibrium depends on c through
equilibrium values of γ∗i , i = 1, 2. From Fig. 5a it is observed
that as λ increases, RGF initially decreases steeply and then
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Fig. 5: The change in ’Revenue Gain Factor’ for ISP and shift in PNE point is being studied with respect to change in
parameters λ, λ0 and c in Figs. 5a, 5b and 5c respectively. We set β = 1, ρ = .9, m1 = 700 and m2 = 900 throughout. In
Fig. 5a, we set c = 0.7 and λ0 = 300, in Fig. 5b, we set c = 0.5 and λ = 1000 and in Fig. 5c, we set λ = 100 and λ0 = 300.
at a slower rate. This change is due to shift of PNE point
from (S, S) to (S,N) when increasing λ. This observation is
natural – if the usual traffic is already high, then the additional
traffic from subsidy may not improve the ISP revenue much.
Thus the ISP prefers a differential pricing regime only in the
case where the intrinsic traffic is not significant compared to
the exogenous traffic. Fig. 5b describes RGF as a function
of λ0 for a fixed λ. Initially the gain increases at smaller
rate with increase in exogenous traffic (λ0) and later the
rate increases. This shift in behavior is again due to shifting
PNE points from (S,N) to (S, S) as CPs are likely to go
for full sponsorship if more exogenous traffic is generated.
Thus, higher the exogenous traffic, more is the the ISP’s
preference for the differential pricing. Fig. 5c shows that RGF
is unaffected by the change in cost keeping PNE point fixed.
However, with the increase in cost, PNE shifts from (S, S)
to (S,N) and thereby causing the drop in RGF. This implies
fixing higher access price may not be beneficial for ISP under
exogenous arrival of demand.
IX. MULTIPLE ISPS
In this section, we extend our analysis for the case of
oligopoly market with several ISPs. We consider two ISPs
but the analysis can be extended to more than two. Each ISP
connects both the CPs to the end users and set the access
price independently. Knowing the access price, the CPs set
the subsidy factor for each ISP independently. Let ci, i = 1, 2
denotes the access price set by ISPi and γij denote the
subsidy factor set by CPj for traffic generated through ISPi.
We denote the traffic rate that flows to CPj from ISPi as λij .
The exogenous traffic rate from ISPi to CPj is λ0(1− γij).
Without loss of generality we assume that c1 < c2. The
interaction framework is described in figure 6.
The cost of an end user that connects via ISPi to CPj
while it is receiving traffic at rate x is given by:
Cij(x) := Cij(x,mj , ci, γij) =
{
1
mj−x + γijci if mj > x,
∞ otherwise.
(19)
Let λ∗ij denote the flows at equilibrium for all i, j = 1, 2.
Lemma 5: For a given γji and ci,∀ i, j = 1, 2, we have
• λ∗1j > 0 and λ
∗
2j = 0 if and only if γ1jc1 < γ2jc2,
Fig. 6: Interaction between the Multi-ISP, CPs and end users.
• λ∗1j = 0 and λ
∗
2j > 0 if and only if γ1jc1 > γ2jc2,
• λ∗1j = λ
∗
2j if and only if γ1jc1 = γ2jc2.
As in Section VII, we assume that CPs either Sponsor
or Not Sponsor traffic of the ISPs, i.e. γij ∈ {0, 1},∀i, j.
This decision is based on the access price proposed by ISPs.
Further, CPs are assumed to sponsor only traffic on one
ISP only, not both. Indeed, a CP cannot contract with two
different ISPs. The resulting action profile for CPs is then
{SN,NS,NN}, where action SN denote that traffic form
ISP1 is sponsored while that from ISP2 is not sponsored,
NS denotes that the other way around and NN denotes that
traffic from none of the ISPs is sponsored.
The CPj’s utility is given by:
Uj(γij) =
∑
i
(βj − ρ(1− γij)ci)(λ∗ij + λ0(1− γij)).
One can compute the equilibrium traffic λ∗ij each CP j gets
from each ISP i using Wardrop conditions as earlier and the
resulting utilities are summarized in Table II.
Utility of ISP i is the total revenue earned from traffic that
goes through his network, i.e.,
Ri(ci) =
∑
j
λ∗ijci.
The following theorem describes the pure Nash equilibrium
of the non-cooperative game between CPs, depending on
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Action SN
SN U1 = (β1 − ρc1)(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
U2 = (β2 − ρc1)(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
NS U1 = (β1 − ρc2)(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
U2 = (β2 − ρc1)(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
NN U1 = β1(m1 − 1/(α− c1))
U2 = (β2 − ρc1)(m2 − 1/α+ λ0)
Action NS
SN U1 = (β1 − ρc1)(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
U2 = (β2 − ρc2)(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
NS U1 = (β1 − ρc2)(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
U2 = (β2 − ρc2)(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
NN U1 = β1(m1 − 1/(α− c1))
U2 = (β2 − ρc2)(m2 − 1/α+ λ0)
Action NN
SN U1 = (β1 − ρc1)(m1 − 1/α+ λ0)
U2 = β2(m2 − 1/(α− c1))
NS U1 = (β1 − ρc2)(m1 − 1/α+ λ0)
U2 = β2(m2 − 1/(α− c1)
NN U1 = β1(m1 −m/2)
U2 = β2(m2 −m/2)
TABLE II: Utility for CPs over actions {SN,NS,NN}. Row
actions correspond to CP1 and column action to CP2
main parameters of the model which are the access prices
ci proposed by ISP i.
Theorem 4: Let ρ, c and βj = β ∀j given. Assume c1 <
c2, then only (SN, SN), (NN,NN) and (SN,NN) can be
PNE. Specifically,
• (SN, SN) is the PNE if and only if
ρ/β ≤ 1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c1(m2 −m/2 + λ0) ,
• (NN,NN) is the PNE if and only if
ρ/β ≥ m/2− 1/α+ λ0
c1(m1 − 1/α+ λ0) ,
• (SN,NN) is the PNE if and only if
1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c1(m2 −m/2 + λ0) ≤ ρ/β ≤
m/2− 1/α+ λ0
c1(m1 − 1/α+ λ0) .
The previous theorem suggests that CPs will not subsidize the
traffic from ISP with higher access price. Further, coupled with
Lemma 5, we note that traffic flow through ISP with higher
cost is null at equilibrium.
Let RGFi, i = 1, 2 denotes the revenue gain factor for ISPi
defined as follows:
RGFi =
(
∑
j λij + λ0(1− γij))ρci
(
∑
j λij)ρci
,
= 1 +
∑
j λ0(1− γij)∑
j λij
.
Considering exogenous arrivals, the usual traffic λ gets split
between the CPs competitively based on the QoS experienced
and the access price whereas the exogenous traffic is fixed
and depends only on the subsidy factory. The total traffic at
CPj at equilibrium is given by λ˜∗j =
∑
i λ
∗
ij + λ0
∑
i(1 −
γij), where λ∗ij are set according to the Wardrop equilibrium.
For all possible action profiles, the equilibrium rates and the
corresponding RGF are given as follows:
1) For (SN, SN): λ∗11 = (m1−m/2+λ0), λ∗21 = 0, λ∗12 =
(m2 −m/2 + λ0) and λ∗22 = 0.
RGF1 = 1 + 2λ0/λ and RGF2 = 1.
2) For (SN,NS): λ∗11 = (m1−m/2+λ0), λ∗21 = 0, λ∗12 =
0 and λ∗22 = (m2 −m/2 + λ0).
RGF1 = 1 + λ0/λ
∗
11 and RGF2 = 1 +
λ0
λ∗22
.
3) For (SN,NN): λ∗11 = m1 − 1/α+ λ0, λ∗21 = 0, λ∗12 =
m2−1/(α−c1) and λ∗22 = 0, where α = c1/2+1/m+√
c21/4 + 1/m
2 and can be bounded as c1+1/m ≤ α ≤
c1 + 2/m.
RGF1 = 1 + λ0/λ and RGF2 = 1.
4) For (NS, SN): λ∗11 = 0, λ
∗
21 = (m1−m/2+λ0), λ∗12 =
(m2 −m/2 + λ0) and λ∗22 = 0.
RGF1 = 1 +
λ0
λ∗12
and RGF2 = 1 + λ0/λ∗22.
5) For (NS,NS): λ∗11 = 0, λ
∗
21 = (m1−m/2+λ0), λ∗12 =
0 and λ∗22 = (m2 −m/2 + λ0).
RGF1 = 1 and RGF2 = 1 + 2λ0/λ.
6) For (NS,NN): λ∗11 = 0, λ
∗
21 = m1 − 1/α+ λ0, λ∗12 =
m2 − 1/(α− c1) and λ∗22 = 0.
RGF1 = 1 and RGF2 = 1 + λ0/λ∗21.
7) For (NN,SN): λ∗11 = m1−1/(α−c1), λ∗21 = 0, λ∗12 =
m2 − 1/α+ λ0 and λ∗22 = 0.
RGF1 = 1 + λ0/λ and RGF2 = 1.
8) For (NN,NS): λ∗11 = m1−1/(α−c1), λ∗21 = 0, λ∗12 =
0 and λ∗22 = m2 − 1/α+ λ0.
RGF1 = 1 and RGF2 = 1 + λ0/λ∗22.
9) For (NN,NN): λ∗11 = (m1 − m/2), λ∗21 = 0, λ∗12 =
(m2 −m/2) and λ∗22 = 0.
RGF1 = 1 and RGF2 = 1.
We illustrate the behavior of RGF for each ISP at different
PNE in Figure 7. Since at PNE, none of the CPs make
sponsorship with ISP2 (ISP with higher access price) and
the RGF of ISP2 remains the same. Therefore, we focus on
the revenue gain of ISP1. It can be seen from Figures 7a-7c
that the behavior of the RGF of ISP1 is exactly same as that
of single ISP case. And there is no impact of c2 on RGF for
both ISPs which is because c2 > c1.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In this work we have analyzed interaction between ISPs,
CPs and end users as a complex interacting system where
sponsoring of the content (differential pricing) is allowed in the
Internet. Our analysis suggests that a CP with poor QoS can
attract more end user traffic demand by offering heavy subsidy
and earn more revenue than a CP with better QoS if the later do
not offer higher subsidy. This implies that differential pricing
schemes can be unfair and decentivize the CPs to improve their
QoS through systematic long term investments, but encourage
them to focus more on the running costs involving subsidies.
Zero-rating schemes thus suit CPs with poor QoS that like to
improve their revenues without updating QoS at their facilities.
Our analysis also suggests that overall QoS experienced by
end users can worsen in the differential pricing regime – if
a CP with poor QoS offers heavy subsidy on access price, it
increases congestion at the CP level (and reduces at the others)
and effectively increases the overall mean delay experienced
by the end users in the network. However, if a CP with better
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Fig. 7: The change in gain for ISPs and shift in PNE point is being studied with respect to change in parameters λ, λ0, c1
and c2in Figs. 7a, 7b, 7c and 7d respectively.We set β = 1, m1 = 700 and m2 = 900 throughout. In Fig. 7a, we set c1 = 0.7,
c2 = 0.9, ρ = 0.9 and λ0 = 300, in Fig. 7b, we set c1 = 0.7, c2 = 0.9, ρ = 0.9 and λ = 900, in Fig. 7c, we set c2 = 0.9,
ρ = 0.8 λ = 1000 and λ0 = 300 and in Fig. 7d, we set c1 = 0.4, ρ = 0.9 λ = 1200 and λ0 = 250.
QoS offers more subsidy than that of the CPs with lower QoS,
the overall delay experienced by the users decreases, making
the differential pricing regime favorable to end users.
As our analysis suggests, differential schemes result in
unfair distribution of revenues among the CPs and degrade
QoS experience for the end users if CPs with poor QoS offer
higher subsidy on access price than the CPs with better QoS.
Thus, as a policy recommendation, we suggest that the CPs
with poor QoS should not be allowed to offer higher subsidy
on the access price than that offered by the CPs with higher
QoS. Alternatively, CPs should be only allowed to subsidize
the access price in proportion to their QoS guarantees.
Our current model looks at single type of content. As
a future work, we will look into a more general model
with multiple types of populations corresponding to different
content types with different QoS requirement at CPs.
APPENDICES
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
First note that by Assumption (2), λ∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2.
From equation (4), there exists α > 0 such that
1
m1 − λ∗1
+ γ1c =
1
m2 − λ∗2
+ γ2c = α.
Simplifying the above we get:
λ∗i = mi −
1
α− γic for i = 1, 2.
In order to compute the value of α, we use the relation λ∗1 +
λ∗2 = λ which yields
m1 +m2 − λ = 1
α− γ1c +
1
α− γ2c .
Simplifying the above, we get a quadratic equation in α. It
is easy to argue that one of the roots is not feasible and the
other root gives the required value of α.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
From (5) for all i = 1, 2 we have
λ∗i = mi −
1
α− γic and
1
mi − λ∗i
= α− cγi.
Substituting in (7) and simplifying we get (8). When γi = γ
for all i, the minimum cost at equilibrium (from (6)) is given
as
α := α(γ, · · · , γ) = cγ + 2
m
.
Finally, Substituting the above in (8) we get (9).
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Substituting value of α from (6) in (8) and simplifying we
have
D(c, γ1, γ2) =
c(γ1 − γ2)(m2 −m1)
2λ
+
m1 +m2
λm
− 2
λ
+ (m1 +m2)
√
(cm(γ1 − γ2))2 + 4
2λm
.
First consider the case γ1 ≥ γ2. It is clear that D(c, γ1, γ2) is
monotonically increasing in c. Now consider the case γ1 < γ2.
Differentiating D(c, γ1, γ2) with respect to c and simplifying
we get
∂D(c, γ1, γ2)
∂c
=
|γ1 − γ2|(m1 +m1)
2λ
×{
−m2 −m1
m1 +m2
+
cm|γ1 − γ2|√
(cm|γ1 − γ2|2) + 4
}
.
It is now easy to verify that the above derivative is positive
for all
c ≥
(√
m2/m1 −
√
m1/m2
)
/(m|γ1 − γ2|)
and it is negative otherwise. Hence D(c, γ1, γ2) is convex in
c with a unique minimum.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 1
From Lemma (4) recall that
D(c, γ1, γ2) =
c(γ1 − γ2)(m2 −m1)
2λ
+
m1 +m2
λm
− 2
λ
+ (m1 +m2)
√
(cm(γ1 − γ2))2 + 4
2λm
.
and
D(c, 1, 1) =
2
m
.
We have
D(c, γ1, γ2) ≥ D(c, 1, 1)
⇐⇒ c(γ1 − γ2)(m2 −m1)
2λ
+
m1 +m2
λm
+(m1 +m2)
√
(cm(γ1 − γ2))2 + 4
2λm
≥ 2
λ
+
2
m
⇐⇒ (m1 +m2)
√
(cm(γ1 − γ2))2 + 4
≥ 2(m1 +m2) + cm(γ2 − γ1)(m2 −m1)
⇐⇒ (cm(γ1 − γ2))2 ≥ 4cm(γ2 − γ1)
(
m2 −m1
m2 +m1
)
+(cm(γ2 − γ1))2
(
m2 −m1
m2 +m1
)2
⇐⇒ (cm(γ2 − γ1))2
(
1−
(
m2 −m1
m2 +m1
)2)
≥ 4cm(γ2 − γ1)
(
m2 −m1
m2 +m1
)
.
When γ1 > γ2, the last inequality holds for all c. Hence the
first claim is proved. Now consider the case γ2 > γ1. Dividing
both sides of the last inequality by γ2−γ1 > 0 and continuing
the chain of if and only if conditions, we have
D(c, γ1, γ2) ≥ D(c, 1, 1)
⇐⇒ cm(γ2 − γ1)
(
1−
(
m2 −m1
m2 +m1
)2)
≥ 4
(
m2 −m1
m2 +m1
)
⇐⇒ c ≥
(
m2
m1
− m1
m2
)
1
m(γ2 − γ1) .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Consider the case γ1 < γ2. From (6) we have
α− cγ1 = c(γ2 − γ1)
2
+
2
m
+
√
(cm(γ1 − γ2))2 + 4
2m
.
Differentiating both with respect to parameter c we get:
∂(α− cγ1)
∂c
=
(γ2 − γ1)
2
+
cm(γ1 − γ2)2
2
√
(cm(γ1 − γ2))2 + 4
.
It is clear that ∂(α−cγ1)∂c > 0 for all c. Hence α − γ1c is
monotonically increasing in c. The claim follows from (5) and
noting that λ∗2 = λ− λ∗1.
Now consider the case γ2 < γ1. From (6) we have
α− cγ2 = c(γ1 − γ2)
2
+
2
m
+
√
(cm(γ1 − γ2))2 + 4
2m
.
Following similar steps above we observe that ∂(α−cγ2)∂c > 0
for all c. Hence α−γ2c is monotonically increasing in c. The
claim follows from (5) and noting that λ∗1 = λ− λ∗2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We have
U1(γ1, γ2)
U2(γ2, γ1)
=
(1− (1− γ1)β)λ∗1
(1− (1− γ2)β)λ∗2
U1(γ1, γ2) ≥ U2(γ2, γ1)
⇐⇒ λ
∗
2
λ∗1
≤ (1− (1− γ1)β)
(1− (1− γ2)β)
⇐⇒ λ
∗
2 + λ
∗
1
λ∗1
≤ (1− (1− γ1)β)
(1− (1− γ2)β)
+ 1
⇐⇒ λ∗1 ≥ λ
1
1−(1−γ1)β
1−(1−γ2)β + 1
.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
(S, S) is a PNE: From Table I, (S, S) is PNF iff the
following two conditions hold
(β − ρc)(m1 − 1/α00) ≥ β(m1 − 1/(α10 − c)
(β − ρc)(m2 − 1/α00) ≥ β(m2 − 2/(α01 − c))
Simplifying these two conditions and using our conventions
that m1 < m2, we get (15).
(N,N) is a PNE: From Table I, (N,N) is PNE iff the
following conditions holds
β(m1 − (1/α11 − c)) ≥ (β − ρc)(m1 − 1/α01)
β(m2 − 1/(α11 − c)) ≥ (β − ρc)(m2 − 1/α10).
Simplifying and using our conventions that m1 < m2, we get
(16).
(S,N) is a PNE: From Table I, (S,N) is PNF iff the following
two conditions hold
(β − ρc)(m1 − 1/α01) ≥ β(m1 − 1/(α11 − c))
(β − ρc)(m2 − 1/(α01 − c)) ≥ (β − ρc)(m2 − 2/α00).
Simplifying these two conditions we get (17).
(N,S) is a PNE: From Table I, (S,N) is PNF iff the following
two conditions hold
β(m1 − 1/(α10 − c)) ≥ (β − ρc)(m1 − 1/α00)
(β − ρc)(m2 − 1/α10) ≥ β(m2 − 1/(α11 − c)).
i.e.,
C :=
1/(α10 − c) + λ0 − 1/α00
c(m1 + λ0 − 1/α00) ≤ ρ/β
ρ/β ≤ 1/(α11 − c) + λ0 − 1/α01
c(m2 + λ0 − 1/α01) =: D. (20)
We will next argue that C ≤ D leads to a contradiction.
We have
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C ≤ D
⇐⇒ 1/(α10 − c)− 1/α00
c(m1 − 1/α00) ≤
1/(α11 − c)− 1/α01
c(m2 − 1/α01)
⇐⇒
(
m2 − 1
α11 − c
)(
m1 − 1
α00
)
≤
(
m1 − 1
α10 − c
)(
m2 − 1
α10
)
⇐⇒ (m2 −m/2) (m1 −m/2)
≤
(
m1 − 1
α10 − c
)(
m2 − 1
α10
)
( from Thm. 2)
⇐⇒ m1
(
1
α10
−m/2
)
+m2
(
1
α10 − c −m/2
)
≤ 1
α10(α10 − c) −
m2
4
( after rearranging)
⇐⇒ m1
(
1
α10
−m/2
)
+m2
(
1
α10 − c −m/2
)
≤ m
2
2 +
√
(cm)2 + 4
− m
2
4
where the last inequality follows by substituting value of
α10 on RHS and simplifying. It is clear that m
2
2+
√
(cm)2+4
−
m2
4 < 0. We will next show that m1
(
1
α10
−m/2
)
+
m2
(
1
α10−c −m/2
)
is nonnegative.
From Corollary 1 we have α10 − c ≤ α00 = 2/m. Hence
we get
m1
(
1
α10
−m/2
)
+m2
(
1
α10 − c −m/2
)
≥ m1
(
1
α10
−m/2
)
+m1
(
1
α10 − c −m/2
)
= m1
2α10 − c
α10(α10 − c) −m1m (after simplifying)
= m1m−m1m = 0,
where the last equality follows after substituting the value of
α10 and simplifying.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof 1: Assume λ∗1j > 0 and λ
∗
2j = 0, then by Wardrop
condition we have
1
mj − λ∗j
+ γ1jc1 <
1
mj − λ∗j
+ γ2jc2
where λ∗j = λ
∗
1j + λ
∗
2j . Hence γ1jc1 < γ2jc2. The other
direction follows by noting that λ∗j 6= 0∀j and applying the
Wardrop conditions. Proof of the other items is similar.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
(SN, SN) is PNE iff the following four conditions hold
(β − ρc1)(m1 −m/2 + λ0) ≥ (β − ρc2)(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
(β − ρc1)(m1 −m/2 + λ0) ≥ β(m1 − 1/(α− c1)
(β − ρc1)(m2 −m/2 + λ0) ≥ (β − ρc2)(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
(β − ρc1)(m2 −m/2 + λ0) ≥ β(m2 − 1/(α− c1)
Solving first two inequalities, we get
c2 ≥ c1; ρ/β ≤ 1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c1(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
Solving second two inequalities, we get
c2 ≥ c1; ρ/β ≤ 1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c1(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
Using our conventions that m1 ≤ m2 , we get (4).
(NN,NN) is PNE iff the following four conditions holds
β(m1 −m/2)) ≥ (β − ρc1)(m1 − 1/α+ λ0)
β(m1 −m/2) ≥ (β − ρc2)(m1 − 1/α+ λ0)
β(m2 −m/2) ≥ (β − ρc2)(m2 − 1/α+ λ0)
β(m2 −m/2) ≥ (β − ρc1)(m2 − 1/α+ λ0)
Solving first two inequalities, we get
ρ/β ≥ m/2− 1/α+ λ0
c1(m1 − 1/α+ λ0)
ρ/β ≥ m/2− 1/α+ λ0
c2(m1 − 1/α+ λ0)
Solving second two inequalities, we get
ρ/β ≥ m/2− 1/α+ λ0
c2(m2 − 1/α+ λ0)
ρ/β ≥ m/2− 1/α+ λ0
c1(m2 − 1/α+ λ0)
Using our conventions that m1 ≤ m2 ; c1 ≤ c2, we get (4).
(SN,NN) is PNE iff following conditions hold
(β − ρc1)(m1 − 1/α+ λ0) ≥ (β − ρc2)(m1 − 1/α+ λ0)
(β − ρc1)(m1 − 1/α+ λ0) ≥ β(m2 −m/2)
β(m2 − 1/(α− c1)) ≥ (β − ρc1)(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
β(m2 − 1/(α− c1)) ≥ (β − ρc2)(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
Solving first two inequalities, we get
c2 ≥ c1; ρ/β ≤ 1/α−m/2 + λ0
c1(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
Solving second two inequalities, we get
ρ/β ≥ 1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c1(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
ρ/β ≥ 1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c2(m2 −m/2 + λ0)
Using our conventions that m1 ≤ m2 and c1 ≤ c2, we get (4).
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(NN,SN) is PNE iff the following four conditions holds
β(m1 − 1/(α− c1)) ≥ (β − ρc2)(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
β(m1 − 1/(α− c1)) ≥ (β − ρc1)(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
(β − ρc1)(m2 − 1/α+ λ0) ≥ (β − ρc2)(m2 − 1/α)
(β − ρc1)(m2 − 1/α+ λ0) ≥ β(m2 −m/2)
Solving first two inequalities, we get
ρ/β ≥ 1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c2(m1 −m/2 + λ0)
ρ/β ≥ 1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c1(m1 −m/2 + λ0) := A1
Solving second two inequalities, we get
c1 ≤ c2; ρ/β ≤ m/2− 1/α+ λ0
c1(m2 − 1/α+ λ0) := B1
Using our conventions that m1 ≤ m2 and c1 ≤ c2, we get
1/(α− c1)−m/2 + λ0
c1(m1 −m/2 + λ0) ≤ ρ/β ≤
m/2− 1/α+ λ0
c1(m2 − 1/α+ λ0)
which is not true because A1 > B1 (the proof is exactly on
same lines to that of C > D).
Other strategies cannot be PNE. This is because the conditions
to be PNE gives c1 ≥ c2 which is contradiction to our
assumption.
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